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THE FCC AND EQUAL TIME:
NEVER-NEVERLAND REVISITED
By RICHARD G. SINGER*
We are now fast approaching that cataclysmic event in American
politics - a Presidential election. It seems appropriate, before that
time rushes upon us unaware, to leap once more into the breach in an
attempt to salvage what may yet remain of a noble effort to bring politi-
cal issues to the attention of the public.' It is the purpose of this article
to explore the Federal Communications Commission's regulation of
political broadcasting2 as affected by the "equal time" provisions of
the Communications Act.3 This evaluation will occur in the context
of the dual purposes of protection of minority parties and their candi-
dates and assurance of a politically astute and informed public, which
the author believes justify government concern with political broad-
casting.4 Specific attention will be turned to the recent (1959) amend-
ments to the statutory scheme, after which questions of reform and
repeal will be discussed.
* Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; A.B., 1963,
Amherst College; J.D., 1966, University of Chicago.
1. Recent activities in Congress demonstrates a continued interest in this area.No less than five bills ranging from one calling for complete repeal of the EqualTime Act (Political Broadcasts), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964), to one calling for exorbitant
extension of the section have been introduced, and at least three days of hearingshave been spent on the topic which, over the years, has continued to intrigue and
baffle the lawmakers.
2. This article will not deal with the problems raised by political editorializing.In connection with this issue, see Report On Editorializing, 1 P & F RADIO Rzo.91:201 (1949). See also Obligation of Licensees to Carry Political Broadcasts, 25P & F RADIO RtG. 1731 (1963).
3. Equal Time Act (Political Broadcasts), 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended,66 Stat. 717 (1952), Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315(1964).
4. The legislative history of § 315 is virtually barren of any indication of clearintent as to the primary purpose and philosophy underlying the section. While the
scant material is somewhat ambiguous, it appears that the section was primarily meantto protect minority candidates. The early bills of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162(1927), provided that if political speeches were allowed by a licensee, then, as respectsthat office, the station would become a common carrier. See generally 67 CONG. RPc.12502-12505 (1926). The wording was struck down as too broad and the current
statutory language was inserted. See 67 CONG. REc. 12502-12504 (1926) (remarks ofSenator Howell, floor manager, and Senator Bratton).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
I. SECTION 315: PAST AND PRESENT
Since section 315 has been drastically amended within the past
few years, it would serve our purposes better to deal first with the
section as it stood before those amendments and then to determine
the effect of the amendments on the law. Prior to the 1959 amendments,
section 315 stated in full :'
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candi-
dates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship
over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the
use of its station by any such candidate.
Questions of statutory definition and interpretation are immedi-
ately presented: (1) Who is a "legally qualified candidate ;" (2) How
does a candidate "use" a station; (3) What is meant by "equal oppor-
tunities ;" (4) What limitations are inherent in the phrase "other such
candidates for that office ;" (5) Does the proviso really mean there is
"no power" of censorship; (6) What does the phrase "no obligation"
import ?
Of these, the central issue has been the second - defining a "315
use." The 1959 amendments were directed solely to this question
and have no effect, except by implication, on the other issues; the
ensuing discussion of these questions thus includes, without differ-
entiation, decisions from both periods. It is only in the discussion of
"use" that the time of the decision becomes important.
The 1959 amendments also endorsed, as appropriate to political
problems, the long-standing fairness doctrine of the Commission.'
This doctrine requires a broadcaster to afford equal opportunities,
similar to those required by section 315, to proponents of both sides
of "controversial" issues; it was originally intended to deal with
problems not specifically falling within the ambit of section 315. In
contrast to the easily applied criteria of equal time, however, the
"fairness doctrine" has neither a clearly defined standard for deter-
mining violations, nor an easily applied remedy. It is thus a combined
"due process" and "equal protection" approach, with all the ambiguities
and difficulties inherent therein, and stands in marked contrast to the
easily applied remedy of section 315. 7 The Commission has indicated
5. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 315, 66 Stat. 717.
6. The Commission first announced the "fairness doctrine" in Mayflower Broad-
casting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941).
7. In commenting on a suggestion that § 315 be repealed and that the fairness
doctrine alone be used to decide controversies, FCC Chairman Rozel Hyde recently
stated: "The fairness doctrine requires the exercise of discretion, and under the time
limits and so forth, I have concerns about doing it adequately and satisfactorily."
Hearings on S. 1548, S. 1859, and S. 1926 Before the Subcomm. on Communications
of the Senate Commerce Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1967) (transcript) [herein-
after cited as 1967 Hearings].
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that it might apply the fairness doctrine to remedy some of the loop-
holes and inequities now present in section 315, discussed below. Little,
however, has yet been done to fulfill this promise.
A. THE "LEGALLY QUALIFIED CANDIDATE"
1. Who is a "Legally Qualified Candidate?"
Using its rule-making power granted by subsection (c) of section
315,8 the Commission has taken as its definition that of the state
in which the election is being conducted. Thus, FCC regulation 73.120
reads :9
A "legally qualified candidate" means any person who has publicly
announced that he is a candidate for nomination . . . or election
in a primary, special, or general election, municipal, county, State
or national, and who meets the qualifications prescribed by the
applicable laws to hold the office for which he is a candidate, so
that he may be voted for [by] the electorate directly or by means
of delegates or electors, and who:
(1) Has qualified for a place on the ballot or
(2) Is eligible under the applicable law to be voted for by
sticker, by writing in his name on the ballot, or other
method, and
(i) has been duly nominated by a political party which
is commonly known and regarded as such, or
(ii) makes a substantial showing that he is a bona fide
candidate for nomination or office....
This willingness of the Commission to adopt state standards has been
criticized as an abdication of its own role, the contention being that
by so defining this term of art, the Commission encourages minority
candidates of small parties to seek equal time, thereby discouraging
stations from granting any time at all to any candidate.1 0 Such criticism,
however, seems to miss the point; the FCC is merely following what
is clearly each state's judgment on the desirability of activity by minor
parties within its borders. Whatever else may be said about this ap-
proach, it must be agreed that the states are in a better position to judge
8. 66 Stat. 717 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1964), amending 48 Stat. 1088
(1934).
9. 47 C.F.R. § 73.120 (1967). This regulation is for AM radio stations. See
also 73.290 (FM), 73.590 (Non-commercial FM) and 73.657 (Television). There is,
however, at least one statutory exception to this definition. In reaction to the Com-
mission's ruling in Letter to Hon. William Benton, 11 P & F RADIO RsG. 233 (1950),
that Communists who qualified under state laws were entitled to equal opportunities,
Congress enacted § 842 of title 50, prohibiting such a result. Communist Control
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1964). Aside from such a provision, however, it appears that
any person who qualifies within a given state for that state's office is protected
by § 315.
10. It was precisely this problem, of course, that led to the 1960 suspension of§ 315 as to the Presidential race. Act of Aug. 24, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74
Stat. 554.
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the desirability of such activities in their respective jurisdictions. While
it places a burden upon the broadcaster in some cases, this policy
reflects as accurately as possible the national feeling on this question."
For this reason, it is submitted, the approach is valid and should be
retained.
The criticism may be more valid, however, in regard to the
Presidential race. Far from being local, the campaign is clearly national,
and it might be that the Commission would be well advised to adopt
different standards for "section 315 candidacy" with regard to this
campaign." Such a position would recognize that some limits should
be placed on the economic detriment which a government may impose
upon any broadcaster, notwithstanding that the licensee is viewed as
a holder of a privilege, and not a right. 13 Nor is this contrary to the
above view as to state races; it is completely consistent to advocate
application of a federal standard in a peculiarly federal race.'
4
2. When is a Candidate "Legally Qualified?"
Still other problems are raised by the "legally qualified" language
of section 315. One court of appeals has endorsed the Commission's
position that equal time need not be given until the speaker has actually
announced an intention to run for office.' 5 This rule has led to the
anomalous position that licensees become subject to the equal time
provisions only after incumbents have officially indicated their candidacy
for re-election, although the incumbents might have appeared on broad-
11. It may be contended that the state statutes allowing fringe parties to receive
write-in votes were not intended to cope with the equal time issue and that a different
standard should be applied. This argument has merit but may be answered by resort-
ing to legislative action. To the possibility that this may prove difficult or time-
consuming, the response clearly must be that if the state legislature is hesitant to
enact a different standard for "§ 315 candidacy" (as it could do) or to limit the
scope of "candidacy," it has made a decision for this purpose.
12. Of course, the Constitution itself declares minimal standards for the office.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 1 5. But surely a different standard for determining access
to broadcasts would not be unconstitutional. No one has suggested that limitations
such as those discussed in note 8 supra are violative of equal protection. The problem
of numerous candidates in national elections is a real one. In 1964 there were 12
Presidential candidates. In 1952, the Commission held that CBS must give equal
network time to a candidate who compiled only 230 votes in one presidential primary
and who was denied admission to the very GOP convention whose nomination for
President he was seeking.
13. This paper will not deal with whether a license ought to be treated as a mere
privilege. Clearly, however, this is the current law.
14. In 1963 the suggestion was made and a bill drafted to the effect that the equal
time requirements should be suspended for all elections for "federal" positions, as well
as for gubernatorial chairs, along the lines of the 1960 suspension. S. 252, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963). See Hearings on S. 251, S. 252, S. 1696, and H.R.J. 247 Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 29 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Equal Time Hearings]. That bill was
defeated, but the idea had its regenesis in S. 1926, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1967),
which was introduced by Senator Pastore on June 8, 1967. In effect, the proposal
aimed at applying the federal definition of "candidate" which had been accepted for
the 1960 suspension - the "major" party contenders - to offices not national in
scope. In accord with what has already been said, it is to be hoped that Senator
Pastore's bill will meet with the same fate as its predecessor and that there will be
no such occurrences in the future.
15. Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., 163 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1947). See
In re WDOC, 31 Fed. Reg. 6668 (1966).
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casts for weeks after their candidacy was, as a practical matter, quite
evident. 1
6
It is true that an official announcement draws an objectively
ascertainable time. But there are times when a Plimsoll line is not
desirable ;17 at the very least, the Commission should undertake to
explain, rather than merely state, this rule and to discuss the pros
and cons of various proposals. As the law now stands, the Commission's
standard can only add significantly to the already innumerable advan-
tages now enjoyed by the incumbent. It is submitted, moreover, that
this position of the Commission may thwart the goal of public edifi-
cation, since a licensee may well believe that, notwithstanding the
inapplicability of section 315 to an incumbent whose candidacy is
unannounced, it should not, under a viable concept of fairness, carry
his broadcasts until such announcement.'
Any change in the existing pattern would almost inevitably
necessitate reliance on the judgment of the licensee, and ultimately of
the Commission, as to when the incumbent becomes a "candidate"
in practical terms. Some initial definitive line might be drawn, such
as eight weeks before the primary or three months before the general
election. While this might not prove satisfactory in every case, the
current dilemma would to some extent be alleviated if the time span
were properly fixed. Some new guidelines, at any rate, should be
adopted.
3. The Applicability to Supporters' Speeches
By far the most important question stated by the "legally qualified
candidate" language is whether it extends to other persons, thereby
making their speeches subject to equal rebuttal time. To this the
Commission, the courts, and Congress have answered resoundingly
and unqualifiedly in the negative. The leading case is Felix v. Westing-
house Radio Stations, Inc.,'9 wherein a suit was brought against a
16. "Reports from Congress," or similar programs, are not subject to § 315 rights
until candidacy is announced. See Carbondale Broadcasting Co., 11 P & F RADIO
RXG. 243 (1953); Radio Station KNGS, 7 P & F RADIO Rxg. 1130 (1952). The
possibilities that a candidate might abuse this doctrine by accumulating the right
to a large quantity of equal time and then using it just before the election have
been largely eliminated by adoption of Commission rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.120(e),
73.290(e) and 73.657(e) (1965), which require a complainant to file objections within
one week after the date of broadcast. Cf. Hon. Allen Oakley Hunter, 11 P & F RADIO
RtG. 234 (1952). See also Hon. Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr., 11 P & F RADIO REG.
245 (1954).
17. The latter portion of this paper, arguing that an objective test is needed in
general elections is not to the contrary. Primaries and candidacies appear far enough
in advance of general elections to eliminate the need for such a test.
18. The broadcaster is caught in a ping-pong game should he decide to be "fair"
and offer the announced candidate equal time, because the announced candidate's
appearance activates § 315 in that lie is a "legally qualified" candidate. An example
of this ping-pong effect is the Suez case, discussed more fully at notes 65 to 68 infra
and accompanying text. The Commission first refused to say whether President
Eisenhower, in commenting on the Suez crisis, had "used" the stations. The networks,
faced with demands for equal time from Eisenhower's opponents, acquiesced. The
Commission then decided that the speech on the Suez situation was not a "use." This
rendered the speeches given by the opponents "uses" for which the President was
entitled to equal time.
19. 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
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station as publisher of libelous material contained in an address by
the party chairman of one of the city's major parties. The defendant
contended that the "no censorship" clause of section 315 barred him
from censoring the speech, which was given on behalf of a specific
candidate, and that no suit for libel could lie against the station.
Ignoring the "immunity for libel" issue,20 the court held that the
statute protected only speeches by candidates, not their supporters.
The section therefore did not forbid censorship of the supporter's
speech, and the station, as publisher of libelous material which it should
have deleted, was subject to liability.
The Felix decision is clearly in accord with the apparent Con-
gressional intent, since Congress has several times defeated attempts
to broaden the section to include political supporters.2 Commission
decisions are in accord with the concept that use by a supporter does
not constitute a "315 use" entitling the opposing candidate to equal
time.22
Notwithstanding this awesome body of precedent, however, the
distinction, in these cases, between speeches by a candidate and those
by a supporter of the candidate is untenable. It can be defended, if at
all, only on the ground that it is exposure alone, and not repetition
of the candidate's name, ideas, or philosophy, that is important in
political races.3 While it is undeniable that personal exposure is the
single most important part of any political campaign, these other factors
cannot be dismissed.24 Furthermore, the possibility of exploitation
of this legal loophole must be recognized; the current interpretation
allows a broadcaster to lend his facilities to a supporter every night
without incurring any 315 obligation, which is patently contrary to
the suggested purposes of the section. The Commission's recent will-
ingness to apply the "fairness doctrine"2 5 to this problem may alleviate
the difficulty to some extent, but it seems much more desirable to
20. See notes 79 to 107 infra and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., 76 CONG. Rtc. 5038 (1932); 78 CONG. Rtc. 10988 (1934) (report ofHouse Conferences on S. 3285, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.). For a complete citation to allpertinent legislative history, the Felix case, supra note 19, is incomparable. See alsoNote, Campaign Speeches On Radio And TV: Impartiality Via The Communications
Act, 61 YALn L.J. 87 (1952).
22. This argument, however, ignores the critical fact that in 1932 Congress didin fact pass such a bill, only to have it pocket-vetoed. The 1934 bill included such aproposal but it was struck in committee. See note, Campaign Speeches On RadioAnd TV: Impartiality Via The Communications Act, 61 YALE L.J. 87 (1952). It
is possible, however, that supporter's speeches may be covered by the "fairness doc-
trine." See Times-Mirror, 24 P & F RADIO RIc. 404 (1962), which applies the
"fairness doctrine" to speeches by even unwelcome supporters. The most recent
example of this phenomenon of the "supporter doctrine" occurred on November
6, 1966, when NBC gave both the Democratic and Republican National Com-
mittees, not the candidates themselves, one half hour to discuss issues in the national
campaign. Vice President Humphrey and two cabinet members appeared for theDemocrats; Richard Nixon appeared for the Republicans. Since no candidate appeared,
the network was under no obligation to give equal time to other political parties
or candidates.
23. This, in fact, appears to have been the general position of the Commission
until at least 1959. See notes 33 to 41 infra and accompanying text.24. Throughout the postmortems of the 1960 campaign, political pundits were
surmising the effect of President Eisenhower's less than full support of RichardNixon; there was feeling that stronger support from the President would have given
Nixon the Presidency.
25. See note 22 siupra.
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expand this section legislatively rather than administratively to in-
clude speeches and other activities by supporters.
B. "SUCH CANDIDATE FOR THAT OFFICE"
Section 315 requires a broadcaster to give equal time only to
candidates for the "office" in contention. While it is by no means a
necessary conclusion from the language, the Commission has con-
sistently held that primary and general elections are contests for
different "offices." Thus, if candidate A, who is unopposed for his
party's nomination, appears on a station while candidates B, C, and
D are running a heated race for their party's nomination, the winner
of the primary, B, cannot then request time equal to that received by
A prior to B's victory, notwithstanding the fact that B and A are
thereafter rivals for the same "office" in the subsequent general elec-
tion." Likewise, A cannot thereafter request equal time to match
B's overexposure during the primary.
This interpretation poses grave possibilities for abuse by a candi-
date in control of his party's nomination. For example, A may be an
incumbent, appearing regularly during the time of the primary of
the other party, while B, a relative unknown, may have little oppor-
tunity for exposure due to a licensee's reluctance to give B's opponents,
C and D (and Z?) equal time. On the other hand, B may be a
powerful figure in his party who allows dummy candidate C to oppose
him simply to obtain air time which A cannot contest. This inter-
pretation may reinforce perpetuation of one-party rule in states where
such rule exists. Moreover, it is scarcely consistent with the Com-
mission's staunchly-held position that it is the exposure itself, not the
content of the exposure, which is regulated by the statute.2 7
The problem is a thorny one; perhaps the best solution at the
moment is to support the present distinction.2" Clearly, though, the
Commission should make some effort to deal with this question, rather
than continuing its present policy of ignoring it.
C. WHAT IS A "USE?"
The most important and perplexing question of interpretation of
section 315 is the definition of the word "use." Under the statute,
only when a candidate "uses" the station's facilities must the station
afford his opponents equal time. 9
26. 11 P & F RADio RiG. 234 (1952); Hon. Allen Oakley Hunter, 11 P & F
RADIo RvG. 234 (1952). See also KWFT, Inc., 4 P & F RADIo Rmc. 885, 886 (1948),
where the Commission, in dictum, said: "[W]ithout regard to the provisions of § 315,
elementary principles of fairness may dictate that a station which has afforded con-
siderable time during the primary to candidates for nomination as the candidate of
a party for a particular office should make a reasonable amount of time available to
candidates for that office in the general election. No general rule can be laid down on
this matter .. " Id. at 886.
27. See the discussion of the pre-Daly position, notes 32 to 40 infra and accom-
panying text.
28. See Equal Time Hearings, supra note 14 (remarks of Senator Monroney),
especially at 216-17.
29. The district court in the Felix case suggested that even though a speech by
a supporter was not one by a "legally qualified candidate," it should be viewed as a
1967]
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It would be difficult to list all the various factual situations which
have been deemed "uses" by the Commission.30  It is necessary, both
for reasons of analysis and understanding, to distinguish between pre-
1959 decisions and those made after the now infamous Lar Daly
decision"' which triggered the 1959 amendments. These earlier de-
cisions, while qualified by the amendments, are by no means overruled,
since Congress made it explicit in the amendments that the exemptions
listed therein were not "uses." Thus, all prior law as to what con-
stitutes a "use" was not changed except for the four categories of
exemptions which will be discussed later.
1. The Pre-Daly Situation
Between 1934 and 1959, the Commission was called upon to
decide, in numerous factual settings, whether the candidate for office
had "used" the station. Thus, the Commission had held 32 that it
was a "use" within section 315 when a candidate (1) appeared on a
radio show, notwithstanding that there was no discussion either of
his candidacy or of public uses in general ;33 (2) appeared for a bow
on a variety show; " (3) made an acceptance speech; 5 (4) made
reports to his constituents;6 and (5) sold used cars.8 7  In sum, the
Commission's position was basically that: "all appearances of a candi-
date no matter how brief or perfunctory are a section 315 use of a
station's facilities within section 315." 38
§ 315 "use:" If 'use' be given the narrow interpretation for which the plaintiff con-
tends, it would be perfectly feasible and legal for a broadcasting station to refuse
its facilities to all candidates, in their own persons, and then allow spokesmen for
one side unlimited time . . . thus frustrating the policy underlying the Act and its
plain intent." Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Station, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 740, 742(E.D. Pa. 1950). Cf. D. L. Grace, 17 P & F RADIO RIg. 697 (1958), where the
Commission first stated that the candidate could "use" the station by allowing his
spokesman to appear for him, but then retreated from that eminently sensible position.
Id. at 698-99.
30. The Commission attempts to do so sporadically. These summaries are the
most fertile source of information, although the short synopses are often inadequate
and sometimes misleading. See 31 Fed. Reg. 6666 (1966) ; 3 P & F RADIO Rig. 2d
1539 (1964) ; 24 P & F RADIO Rg. 1901 (1962); 17 P & F RADIO RiG. 1711 (1958).
31. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 18 P & F RADIO Rtr. 238 (1959).
32. Throughout this article, the word "held," when used in connection with
Commission decisions, must be viewed warily. Actually, most of these decisions are
found in advisory letters issued by the Commission in response to inquiries made by
broadcasters and are in no real sense "holdings" which are in any way binding on
the Commission or the courts, either as res judicata or stare decisis. On the
other hand, the real law of this field is made in such advisory letters, since rarely
will a disenchanted candidate follow judicial procedure after the election, and even
more rarely will he be able to receive judicial attention beforehand. As to these
difficulties, including the question of whether such opinions are judicially reviewable,
see the discussion of remedies and sanctions available to the Commission and the
candidate, notes 140 to 144 infra and accompanying text.
33. 7 P & F RADIO REG. 1132 (1952).
34. FCC Public Notice 63585. Summary of its ruling in an unpublished letter,
noted in 17 P & F RADIO REG. 1711, 1713 (1958).
35. Progressive Party, 7 P & F RADIO RMG. 1300 (1952).
36. Radio Station KNGS, 7 P & F RADIO RwG. 1130 (1952).
37. Station KTTV, 14 P & F RADIO RgG. 1227 (1957).
38. Kenneth E. Spengler, 14 P & F RADIO REG. 1226b (1956). This position in-
cluded ceremonial appearances. Thus, the Commission advised CBS that an appear-
ance by President Eisenhower on behalf of the Community Chest would be a "use"
within § 315 notwithstanding that the appearance was a traditional duty performed
[VOL. XXVII
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One major exception, however, was carved from the general rule.
In the Allen Blondy case, 9 the Commission indicated that mere cover-
age of a newsworthy event which happened also to include an appear-
ance of the candidate was not a section 315 "use." Although the facts
of the case may somewhat limit the holding,4" it was nevertheless
accepted as authority for the proposition that film clips of news events,
when not clearly biased for or against a candidate, were not a "use"
under 315.
2. The Lar Daly Case
It was against this background that Lar Daly filed a complaint
demanding time equal to his opponents' in the mayoralty race in
Chicago. The Commission's short opinion can be reprinted in full :41
Commission unanimously instructed staff to inform you
that following film clips constituted 315 "use" entitling Lar
Daly to equal opportunities:
A. Separate clips showing Mayor Daley and Candidate
Sheehan filing their political petitions with Chicago
City Clerk as candidates for Democratic and Repub-
lican nominations.
B. Formal endorsement of Sheehan's candidacy by
Chicago Republican Committee.
C. Hugh Hill's interview of Sheehan.
D. Hugh Hill's interview of Connel and Sheehan.
Commission by 4 to 3 vote instructed staff to inform you
that following clips also constituted 315 "use:"
A. Daley greeting President Frondizi of Argentina,
Midway Airport, Chicago.
B. Daley's appeal for funds, March-of-Dimes Polio
Drive.
Conflict in amount of time to be resolved by parties on
basis of facts.
Within three days of the Lar Daly decision, Congressional hear-
ings were begun on ways to amend section 315 to avoid the impetus
of the decision. In fact, the ramifications of the opinion were staggering:
every film clip used by any station in any newscast, whether or not
by the incumbent regardless of political affiliation. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 14 P & F RADIO RG. 524 (1956). Adlai Stevenson immediately waived his rights.
See United Community Campaigns, 3 P & F RADIO RgG. 2d 320 (1964?. Likewise,
appearances of Mr. Stevenson at a Governor's Day Program were 'uses" which
allowed his Presidential opponent to request and receive equal time. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 11 P & F RADIO R.G. 241 (1952).
39. Allen H. Blondy, 14 P & F RADIO REG. 1199 (1957).
40. The candidate was one of a number of judges who were sworn into office and
was only briefly depicted.
41. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 18 P & F RADIO REG. 238-39 (1959).
1967]
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the event was independently newsworthy, would result in a legally
enforceable right to equal time on the part of every candidate for the
same office.
4 2
The Lar Daly decision was the logical culmination of an effort
by the Commission to assure equality for minority party candidates
and to ban once and for all the possibility of discriminatory coverage
of the news. But the decision neglected completely the second purpose
of the statute - to provide reasonable opportunity for the public to
become informed of political events. Within six months, Congress had
enacted amendments to section 315. To these we now turn.
3. The 1959 Amendments
While the 1959 amendments were prompted by the obvious diffi-
culties broadcasters would encounter in trying to abide by the Lar Daly
decision concerning newscasts, they not only vitiated that case by
exempting newscasts from the equal opportunities obligation, but also
instituted even more sweeping reforms which licensees had been seek-
ing for years. News interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot
coverage of bona fide news events were also made exempt from the
requirement. Proposals to exempt debates and panel discussions were
rejected.4 3
As finally enacted, the amendments provided that :
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any
(1) bona fide newcasts,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of
the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the
subject or subjects covered by the news documen-
tary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (in-
cluding but not limited to political conventions and
activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to
be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning
of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence
shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in con-
nection with the presentation of newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot
coverage of news events, from the obligation im-
42. As the reader may have gathered, the "equal opportunities" language of§ 315 has come to mean exactly equal time. Of course, the time must be equal in
more than merely amount. The same opportunity to reach roughly the same number
of viewers in the same time period, under similar conditions and format, is also
required. See D. L. Grace, 17 P & F RADIO RzG. 697 (1958) ; Stephens Broadcasting
Co., 3 P & F RADIO RIr. 1 (1945).
43. See Hearings on H.R. 7985 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, 70, 72 (1952) (Testimony
of Robert Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board of NBC).
44. 73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964). The last sentence embodies the
"fairness doctrine" previously referred to at note 6 supra.
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posed upon them under this chapter to operate in
the public interest and to afford reasonable oppor-
tunity for the discussion of conflicting views on
issues of public importance.
The 1959 amendments have, by and large, had the effect hoped
for by their proponents. Regularly scheduled news interview shows
have had no problem in receiving Commission approval of exemption.4"
News shows have been freed from complaints of the Lar Daly type.4
In addition, documentaries reporting on current off-year elections and
campaigns, which covered many candidates, have been held exempt.4"
It is possible to classify post-1959 Commission decisions according
to each exemption. While the Commission has done so to some extent,
it has apparently preferred to apply the same standards to every pro-
gram; the groups are thus factually and legally intermixed and shall
be so treated. The Commission's tests, which were announced in a
letter sent to licensees, are :48
(1) the format, nature and content of the programs; (2)
whether the format, nature and content of the program has changed
since its inception and, if so, in what respects; (3) who initiates
the programs; (4) who produces and controls the program; (5)
when the program was initiated; (6) is the program regularly
scheduled; and (7) if the program is regularly scheduled, specify
the time and day of the week it is broadcast.
These criteria are controlling even though the broadcaster has
honestly judged that the program is newsworthy.4 9 The Commission
does not upset the licensee's determination of newsworthiness but takes
the position that "bona fide" means more than an honest exercise of
news judgment.50 This, of course, is reminiscent of the stance taken
in the Lar Daly case and preceding opinions that minority candidates
cannot be placed at the whim of the broadcaster, whether that whim
be intentionally discriminatory or not. These criteria and the resulting
strict standard have the value of protecting minority candidates, who
often find themselves out of the news for long periods of time and who
45. "Eye of Philadelphia," telegram to Joseph A. Schafer (1959); "Search
Light," telegram to Ethel Lobman (1961) ; "City Side," telegram to Charles Luthardt(1962) ; "New York Forum," telegram to Social Labor Party of New Jersey (1961),
all reported in 24 P & F RADIO RgG. 1901, 1909-10 (1962).
46. Minor exceptions will be noted as to "candidate-announcer" cases at note 57infra and accompanying text.
47. Telegram to Judge John J. Murray, 31 Fed. Reg. 6666 (1966).
48. Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 P & F RADIO
Rv.o. 1901 (1962). In laying down these guidelines, the Commission has been heavilyinfluenced by legislative history. Congress indicated that the "bona fide" stipulation
attached to all four categories was meant to insure that the news event was not one
staged for the advantage of the candidate involved. H.R. R1P. No. 1069, 86th Cong., 1stSess. 4 (1959). With respect to the first two categories, newscasts and news inter-
views, Congress intended that the program be regularly scheduled to be exempt.
49. The Goodwill Station, Inc. (WJR), 24 P & F RADIO RIg. 413 (1962).
50. National Broadcasting Company, Inc. and Columbia Broadcasting System,
24 P & F RADIO Rlc. 401 (1962).
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would probably be neglected completely, all within the "honest news
judgment" of the broadcaster.
The difficulty is that the Commission has been inconsistent in
applying these various criteria; in one instance one is weighed more
heavily, in another instance one of the other criteria may be accorded
greater weight with the result being that different conclusions are
reached in essentially the same fact situations. This is a not uncommon
position for the Commission,51 but it is an uncommonly unhappy one
for the broadcaster. Indeed, the inconsistency here may well make the
broadcaster wonder if he has not opened a Pandora's box which, though
possibly not increasing his overall burden, has certainly failed to alleviate
it substantially.
Specially scheduled interviews have not been exempted because of
the Commission's particular attention to the desire of Congress that only
regularly scheduled interviews be exempted.52  The Commission has
adhered to this policy in the face of station arguments that news inter-
views are a regular feature during election periods.
Press conferences of candidates are non-exempt,5 3 because not a
regularly scheduled feature; but portions of the same conferences are
completely inviolate if presented in newscasts. 4 Similarly, other non-
exempt appearances become exempt if only partially covered. 5 Candi-
dates who are announcers are exempt if the subject matter is prepared
by someone else,56 but not if the candidate controls the substance, not-
withstanding the non-political nature of the talks.57 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in affirming the first of the "announcer" cases,5"
only added to the confusion by adding another factor - the presence
or absence of intent on the part of the station to help the candidate.
This would seem to conflict with the already noted Commission de-
cisions holding that "honest news judgment," i.e., lack of intent to
favor a candidate, is an irrelevant factor in section 315 cases.5 9
Some inconsistencies are nevertheless present. The most notorious
example, perhaps. is the NBC case 6 ° in which the Commission, in one
51. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRA4IV AGENCIES: Tim NEED
FOR BETTER DsFINIoN Or STANDARDS 53-57 (1962).
52. H.R. REP. No. 1069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959). This has sometimes
been carried to extremes. In National Broadcasting Company, Inc. and Columbia
Broadcasting System, supra note 50, the Commission held that debates between two
gubernatorial candidates before the United Press International annual convention
were not exempt, although the station regularly carried the convention and the debate
before that convention in election years. Likewise, in The Goodwill Station, 24
P & F RADIO RG. 413 (1962), the fact that a club had invited two gubernatorial
candidates to debate in accord with normal club policy and the fact that these debates
were covered as part of regular election coverage did not exempt them.
53. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 3 P & F RADIO Rla. 2d 623 (1964).
54. Id. at 625 (dictum). But see Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. and
National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (1960), as reported in 31 Fed. Reg. 6666 (1966).
55. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 623 (1964).
56. KWTX Broadcasting Co., 19 P & F RADIO REG. 1075 (1960).
57. See WMAY, 4 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 849 (1965). But see Brigham v.FCC, 276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960) (equal time need not be given where the announcer-
candidate broadcasts weather reports as his regular job and was not identified by name
on the air. The court held that the weather forecasts were "bona fide" newscasts
within the meaning of the 1959 amendments).
58. Id.
59. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
60. Lar Daly, 20 P & F RADIO REG. 350 (1960).
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set of telegrams, held that the "Today" show was a bona fide news in-
terview show and thus exempt from the equal time requirements of sec-
tion 315, but that the "Tonight" show was not, and that the appearance
of Presidential candidates Kennedy and Nixon on the show required
NBC to give equal time to a minority candidate. In the first decision,
the Commission discussed the "Today" format at great length, noting
that it focused on news and news events and often contained interviews
with leading political and world figures. In its second holding, the
Commission refused to go behind the formal aspects of the "Tonight"
application, basing its holding on the single fact that in past renewal
applications NBC had listed the show as a "variety" show in its program
logs; the program logs of "Today" had never been mentioned. More-
over, the Commission disregarded completely the possibility that Jack
Parr, then hosting the "Tonight" show, might have conducted the in-
terviews with complete impartiality; the mere fact of listing in the
program logs raised an apparently irrebuttable presumption that any
interview on the show was not a bona fide news interview.
It is possible that the Commission took official notice of the fact
that Parr had control over the questions which would be asked the
candidates. While it would seem that the important question is whether
the candidate has control of a news interview show, the Commission
apparently insists that the programming department of the station, as
opposed to the interviewer, maintain control.6' This hypothesis is
buttressed by the fact that the Commission held Barry Gray's show
non-exempt due to his freedom to control the interview.62 In the
"Today" telegram, the Commission specifically pointed out that the
station formulated the questions which the interviewer was to ask.
But since the only relevant question is whether the candidate has con-
trol, the Commission's preoccupation with form seems to completely
ignore the purpose of the 1959 amendments.
Form is also exalted over substance in the Commission's rigid
adherence to the "regularly scheduled" criterion. Even where a station
has a policy of interviewing major candidates during election periods, the
Commission does not regard these interviews as "regularly scheduled."
Yet the same end can be accomplished by arranging to have the
candidates appear on an established interview program, and equal
time liability is thereby avoided.
Presidential appearances on radio and television have created an
ambiguous area in the application of section 315. While the President
has less control over press conferences than over prepared statements,
the latter are more apt to gain exemption. In responding to inquiries
of the Republican Party, the Commission indicated that President
Johnson's appearance on nationwide television, reporting on a change
in Kremlin leadership and the Chinese nuclear explosions would be
exempt,61 although it had recently held that a Presidential press confer-
61. It may be that the Commission fears bias on the part of some interviewers.
Why this same possibility is not present when the programming department provides
questions is not clear.
62. WMCA, Inc., 24 P & F RADIO REG. 417 (1962).
63. Republican National Committee, 3 P & F RADIO RIM. 2d 647 (1964).
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ence was not exempt.64 One possible rationale of these two decisions,
and one which was not suggested by the Commission in either of the
cases, is the lack of control of timing of the event - an echo of the
"regularly scheduled" standard. The President is free to call or not call
press conferences at his will, while he has no such control over the
course of international events.
One of the most interesting comparisons to be made between the
pre-1959 period and the decisions under the present statute is afforded
by two almost identical cases, the Suez case6 5 and the Goldwater case.66
The facts in the cases are virtually the same. In both, the incumbent
President, spurred by quite radical changes in the international political
climate,67 addressed the nation in his capacity as Chief Executive some
two or three weeks prior to the election. Immediately thereafter, his
chief opponents requested and were refused equal time from the net-
works. The Suez case was brought in 1956 and was based solely on the
equal time provisions of section 315. The request for equal time was
denied on the ground that the "use" was not by a candidate (though
under current Commission doctrine any exposure was a "use")," but
by the Chief Executive.
64. See, e.g., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 623 (1964).
65. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 14 P & F RADIO REG. 720 (1956)
(Commissioner Hyde dissenting).
66. Republican National Committee, 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 647 (1964) ; Republi-
can National Committee, 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 767 (1964) ; both rulings affirmed
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in an unreported opinion, cert. denied
sub. noma. Goldwater v. FCC, 379 U.S. 893 (1964).
67. With Eisenhower, the Suez crisis; with Johnson, the ouster of Khrushchev and
the detonation of Red China's first atomic bomb. It has been contended that the first
of these was a real international "crisis," the second only a "change," and that the
law should recognize an exemption for Presidential speeches falling under the former
category, but not under the latter. Derby, Section 315: Analysis and Proposal, 3
HARV. J. LEGIs. 257 (1966). The distinction is logical, but hardly consistent with
the "charitable appearance" case, note 38 supra, which Mr. Derby also embraces.
What Mr. Derby says about the latter cases is also applicable to a "crisis: 'This type
of appearance projects an extremely favorable image of a candidate and can be con-
trolled by him within limits." Id. at 282. He recognizes this but dispels it with the
statement that "In the national interest the President should be completely free to
use broadcasting facilities when such use is necessary." Id. at 296. Exactly why it is
"in the national interest" to bar opponents of the President from equal time, however,
is not made clear, except for the assertion that the nation "must present a unified
posture to the world" in times of international emergency. The proposition must be
rejected; too many events require "unified posture" in this context. Yet the essence
of an election must be to give viable, if unpleasant, alternatives to the voter.
Realistically, no candidate would attack the administration's position during
an "international crisis" unless it were almost patently unsound. If, however, this
were the case, the position of the government should obviously be subject to public
debate prior to the most important election in the country.
It should also be noted that indirect criticism may suffice as well as direct.
In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, there were not lacking those who indicated
that the entire Administration approach to international affairs was wrong and
directly responsible for the precipitation of the crisis. Surely it cannot be argued that
the basic decision as to approach and philosophy in the international arena should be
left undiscussed simply because a "crisis" happens to arise during an election campaign.
It might also be that an opponent would choose to comment on domestic
affairs, rather than on the international issue, as would be consistent with § 315 rights,
and that his demeanor and approach there would reflect, though silently, his posture
on the international scene.
68. The decision did not say why this appearance was in theory any different
from that of the "Chief Executive" in opening the Community Chest drive. Cf.
14 P & F RADIO REG. 524 (1956) (Commissioner Hyde dissenting). For a scathing
criticism, see Friedenthal and Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political
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The Goldwater decision in 1964, however, rested on two alternative
grounds. Citing the Suez case as controlling at first blush, the Com-
mission then went on to hold that the Presidential address in question
was "on-the-spot" coverage and therefore exempt under the amend-
ments.69 Commissioner Hyde, in his dissent, stressed the importance
of exposure on television and pointed out that Congress, though pre-
sumptively acquainted with the Suez exception, had not written it into
the statute.7 °
Thus far, the two cases are on all fours, both in treatment and
outcome, for the "on-the-spot" exemption language in the Goldwater
case was dictum. Having failed to obtain a favorable ruling under
section 315 proper in Goldwater, the Republican National Chairman
then applied for equal time under the "fairness doctrine" adopting the
implicit suggestion of Commissioner Hyde's dissent of a requirement
of fairness of exposure. 7' The Commission accepted this contention
by holding that the fairness doctrine did apply in the instant situation.
However, relief would be granted only if the networks were found to
have acted unfairly. The Commission, in concluding that the networks
had not been unfair, cited instances of coverage by the networks of
Goldwater's reaction to the speech by President Johnson. Once again,
Commissioner Hyde dissented :72
Television has the unique capability of presenting the per-
sonality of the candidate before the public. The three national
television networks have made a simultaneous presentation of one
of the two major candidates in a special program in prime time
without compensation to the networks, and they have refused to
provide an opportunity for a presentation of the other major
candidate under comparable circumstances.
The Goldwater cases are extremely useful tools for a number of
purposes. In the first place, they show the willingness of the Com-
mission to apply the fairness doctrine to politics in general, a willingness
not so clear in 1956,"3 while nevertheless adhering to a rather strict
interpretation of the "use" doctrine. Second, the cases demonstrate
that the amendments have not resulted in changes as sweeping as
Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HARv. L. Rgv. 445 (1959).
"The new exception . . . is unwise since any appearance . . . puts a candidate at an
unfair advantage if his opponent cannot obtain an equal opportunity. . . . Indeed it is
precisely this type of appearance during a political campaign that should be declared
a use before all other types of nonpolitical or nonpartisan appearances are so declared."
Id. at 476.
69. It cannot be successfully argued that this was a wholly alternative holding;
the Commission's emphasis makes it clear that it was highly dubious as to the solidity
of this principle and intended it only as a secondary ground for the decision.
70. 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 647, 655 (1964) (Commissioner Hyde's dissent).
71. Id.
72. 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 767, 771 (1964).
73. This parallelism can be overdrawn. In the Suez case, as Commissioner Hyde
in his Goldwater dissent noted, the networks had in fact given equal time to Stevenson;
but this would not have prevented Stevenson from bringing a complaint to the FCC.
The fact that he did not is at least somewhat persuasive that he did not believe he
had a viable claim.
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might have been anticipated. The Commission did not, in the first
Goldwater case, primarily rely on the idea that this was "on-the-spot"
coverage, although that path was open to it.74 Instead it chose to rely
on the rather tenuous theory that this was not a "use."
There are other difficulties with the Goldwater cases, especially the
second decision, which seem to bear out the fears which plagued critics
of the amendments who opposed the preemption of section 315 by the
fairness doctrine. 75  The facts emphasized by the Commission raise
perplexing problems in the light of the statutory language and purpose.
For example, the Commission noted that Goldwater had been invited
to appear on "Meet the Press." If, in fact, the invitation was made
to assuage the irate candidate, was it a "bona fide" news interview?76
The Commission also mentioned that various news shows had carried
Goldwater's views of the new international developments, and it relied
heavily on the fact that prime time had been devoted to these news-
casts. But would these newscasts have been "bona fide" if they had
not carried Goldwater's views? Or could they be "bona fide" if in
fact the only reason his views were explained was to comply with the
fairness doctrine?
Still one more observation must be made in connection with these
cases. The Commission in Goldwater further cited the fact that Party
Chairman Burch had been allowed to reply to Johnson's speech, although
Goldwater himself had not been allowed to answer. This was noted,
however, in the discussion of the "fairness" issue, not under the "equal
time" doctrine. Thus, the Commission implicitly reaffirmed its position
that a candidate does not "use" the station when his supporter is
given time to advocate the candidate's views. Had the Commission
so desired, it could easily have dismissed the complaint on the basis
that this was a "use" and that Goldwater had in fact been given equal
time. The reluctance to dispose of the case in such a manner demon-
strates that the "supporter doctrine" is still viable.
The 1959 amendments have been successful in erasing the Lar
Daly doctrine, a result which is beneficial to all concerned.77 And
to the extent that Congress was concerned with the public's opportunity
to be informed of news events through presentation in a form other
than newscasts, the legislation has again proven clearly successful.
No one would deny that broadcasters should be able to present
newscasts and other current events without fear of reprisal by minority
74. Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice Black, argued, in dissenting from
denial of certiorari in the cases, that a strong case could be made that this was not
".'on-the-spot" coverage. 379 U.S. at 894 (1964). Clearly the thrust of the exemption
is not aimed at conferences called by one party specifically to allow press coverage.
75. See notes 133 to 139 infra and accompanying text.
76. This, of course, goes to motive or intent of the broadcaster, a factor the Com-
mission has ruled irrelevant. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text. But
surely if one licensee centered, every night, on only one candidate during a "regularly
scheduled" newscast, there would be a retreat from this position. Thus, the "regularly
scheduled" criterion is only a necessary, not a sufficient, ingredient of the "bona fide"
quality of the program.
77. In 1963, when Daly complained of live coverage of a St. Patrick's Day
parade in which the current Mayor was participating, the Commission held the
appearance exempt as "on-the-spot" coverage. Lar Daly, 3 P & F RADIO RxG. 2d 1539,
1543 (1963).
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opponents. Of the various exceptions promulgated by the amendments,
the one for newscasts is the most easily supported. Newscasts are
seldom used to expound at great length the philosophy of the candidates;
they are often "human interest" more than "politics." However, the
other exceptions which Congress enacted in 1959 cannot be so de-
fended. If protection of minorty views is to be supported on any
utilitarian basis at all, which seems to be the thrust of the 1959
legislation, it must be that minority parties often serve as the initiators
of critical introspection into the political and social system as a whole.
Their platforms have many times become the predecessors of programs
later pursued by the larger parties. Thus, any exemption which pre-
vents the espousal of minority party views, as opposed to exposure of
minority party candidates, merely undercuts the basic rationale of
section 315 and, in fact, of the raison d'etre of the smaller party.
Exposure of the candidate is least important to these activities; it is
exposure of the idea which is their hope.
The 1959 amendments have thus clearly served as deterrents to
third party candidates who cannot now request equal time on shows
specifically meant to serve as sounding boards for political philosophies,
such as "Meet the Press." That this was the Congressional intent seems
clear ;78 whether it is desirable is highly dubious.
D. THE "No POWER OF CENSORSHIP" CLAUSE:
HEREIN OF LIBEL AND IMMUNITY
In the original statute, Congress specifically forbade any censor-
ship of speeches broadcast under the aegis of the section. 79 In Sorenson
v. Wood,"° the broadcaster vainly contended that since he could not
censor a speech given by a supporter of a candidate because of this ban,
he was immune from liability in a libel suit. The court rejected this
contention, as have many later Supreme Court statements, that libel
was not protected by the first amendment, that it was therefore not
protected by section 315, and that the station therefore failed in its
duty as publisher of the libel to delete it from the speech. Thus, the
''no censorship" clause was limited to mean "no censorship" except
where censorship is not censorship.
In at least this one particular, the law is now clear. In Farmer's
Educational and Co-operative Union v. WDAY, Inc., l the Supreme
Court rejected the Sorenson rule and held that section 315 contained
an "implied immunity" for licensees against suits for libel. The case,
in this regard, obviated the dilemma which had been created by the
FCC's decision in In re Port Huron,2 in which the Commission had
held83 that a licensee could not, Sorenson notwithstanding, delete
78. The House Report on the 1959 amendments suggests that § 315 was not
repealed because Congress desired to retain the principle of "substantial equality."
H.R. RgP. No. 1069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959). Whether this is achievable by
the methods proposed is questionable.
79. 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 66 Stat. 717 (1952), 73 Stat. 557 (1959),
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
80. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
81. 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (5-4 decision).
82. 4 P & F RADIO RWg. 1 (1948).
83. In fact, this was not the holding. The case was a license renewal proceeding,
and the license was renewed; this would be the technical "holding." But clearly this
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libelous statements from section 315 speeches.' The Court further
found that state libel laws had been preempted in this field by federal
law. 5  The facts in WDAY were that allegations were made by a
Republican candidate for the United States Senate that his Democratic
opponents were clearly connected with petitioner, an independent farm
organization, which the candidate then alleged to be Communist-
controlled. The licensee, believing the statements libel per se, yet op-
erating under the ruling of the Port Huron decision that deletion was
forbidden, expressly asked the candidate to request time under section
315, thereby hoping to come under a dictum in Port Huron that
immunity would be provided by the statute. The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed a motion to dismiss the libel suit on the pleadings on
the basis of section 315.86 One judge dissented.
In affirming the dismissal, the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, stated that "censorship"
means censoring to any extent87 and is prohibited, and therefore a
licensee is forbidden to delete libel from a political speech. On this
point, the four dissenters concurred with the majority's holding.8"
The difficult problem was whether the Communications Act, having
opened the licensee to possible liability, provided him immunity8 9
To Justice Frankfurter's dissenting comments that Congress had
consistently rejected bills which would expressly have granted such
an immunity, 90 the Court responded with the legislative history of
bills which would have allowed the station to censor libelous material,
all of which had also failed.91 The rationale was that the mere failure
of each set of bills did not prove Congressional intent on the issue;
if anything, such failure evinced an unmistakable desire to insulate the
licensee in one way or another. The fact that none of these bills had
ever passed either house was thought unimportant. There was, how-
ever, one aspect of the legislative history which supported the majority;
there had been no definite adverse Congressional response to the
clear FCC policy announced in Port Huron, though the Communications
is the proposition for which the case has stood. Compare Sorenson v. Wood, 123
Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), with In re Port Huron, 4 P & F RADIO RgG. 1 (1948).
84. The FCC has just recently held that the "no censorship" provision in § 315
even justifies a licensee's refusal to cancel a candidate's broadcast even if the broad-
cast clearly and unmistakably distorts the position of his opponent. Capitol Broad-
casting Co., Inc., Document 67-800, 36 U.S.L.W. 2062 (FCC Jul. 5, 1967). Com-
missioner Cox dissented, arguing that where the opponent calls attention to the dis-
tortions prior to the broadcast, the licensee should at least be under a burden to
investigate the charges.
85. Cf. 44 MINN. L. lRv. 787 (1960) which suggests that the Court specifically
found the "implied immunity" to avoid a clear holding on the preemption point.
86. Farmer Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.,
89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1958).
87. The Court may have overlooked 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964) which provides:
"Whoever utters any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio com-
munciation shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both." Perhaps the immunity does not go this far.
88. Compare 360 U.S. at 527-31, with 360 U.S. at 535-36.
89. Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.,
360 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1959).
90. Id. at 540; note 4 supra.
91. Id. at 532-33, particularly nn.13 & 14.
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Act had been amended twice since that decision. If the other history
was in balance, the presumption of Congressional acquiescence was
persuasive.
Despite the distortions of presumptions, the majority's reading of
the Congressional intent is probably correct. Although it has been
suggested that the result itself is unconstitutional,9 2 it can certainly
be argued that the contrary result would be just as violative of the
fifth amendment93 and of the "unconstitutional conditions" rule. 4
Moreover, although the Communications Act specifically states that
licensees are not common carriers, 5 the peculiar thrust of section 315
is to negate that statement as far as political speeches are concerned
and to make licensees, at the very least, "quasi common carriers.""
Since common carriers are exempt from liability for libel which they
transmit,97 it is submitted that this result should also be afforded a
licensee under the Communications Act and that WDA Y is therefore
correct. The decision, moreover, is in keeping with the clear policy
behind section 315; immune from libel suits, licensees are much more
apt to allow political speeches in general. The subsequent public en-
lightenment is surely the goal of the statute and its provisions.
Even if the WDA Y Court is correct in its general result, however,
the reasoning in the case is open to serious criticism. First, the majority
seemed to brush aside the contention of the petitioner that even if
section 315 could be construed to grant an immunity in some cases,
this was not such a case." The point, argued vehemently by the dis-
senting judge in the state court,9 9 was that the libel had been directed
not at an opposing candidate, but at a person somewhat related to,
but not intimately involved in, the political fray. 'While it was possible
to view candidates as accepting the risk of extreme and even libelous
statements, he argued, it could scarcely be said that the same was
true of innocent third parties. Furthermore, the libeled candidate
may be allowed an immediate remedy under section 315 - equal time
in which to answer. The third party has no such luxury. While it
might be argued that the petitioner in the instant case, being somewhat
involved in the campaign, had given at least limited tacit approval to
mud-slinging, the Court's rationale goes beyond this situation to the
92. Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by
Political Candidates, 39 VA. L. Rtv. 303, 315 n.60 (1953) : "(I)t [the result] may
be held to relieve citizens of legal remedies without compensation in kind, and that
it usurps the state police power. Patently, it contravenes section 414 of the Com-
munications Act, which states that existing remedies at common law or by statute
are not abridged."
93. Strict liability for libel, when one is legally unable to avoid causing the
injury, would appear to deprive one of a right to defense without due process of law.
94. See generally French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 Gso. L.J.
234 (1961).
95. But see 67 CONG. Ric. 12502 (1926).
96. Note, Censorship of Defamatory Political Broadcasts: The Port Huron
Doctrine, 34 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 127 (1959).
97. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Western Union, 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940).
98. See Brief for Petitioner at 39-46, Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union
of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
99. Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.,
89 N.W.2d 102, 111-12 (N.D. 1958).
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one involving a completely uninvolved person against whom the
candidate happens to carry an indisposition. 0°
Furthermore, the Court's definition of censorship, if applied to
other situations which could arise, might result in precisely the con-
fusion the Court was trying to avoid here, especially in light of judicial
precedents.'' For example, the Court did not consider the Felix prob-
lem, discussed above, 10 2 of whose speeches are protected by the section,
unless one considers the passing disapproval of Sorenson as indicative
of the Court's view on this question. Sorenson, it must be remembered,
involved a supporter's speech. Disapproval of that case may indicate
that a licensee could not censor a supporter's speech consonant with
section 315. Yet such a position would require an implicit holding
that "use" includes use by a supporter, a conclusion completely contrary
to the law as it now stands. 0 3 Under Felix, censorship is required to
protect the licensee; under WDA Y, there is at least some doubt as to
whether such deletion is constitutional.0 4
It would, of course, be much too strong to say that the Court is
compelled by the reasoning in WDAY to include supporters within
the aegis of section 315. Yet its failure to even consider this problem,
or the problem of the innocent third party who is libeled, makes the
decision one which must be viewed warily as a precedent on these
questions.
Moreover, the facility with which the Court simply overrode the
libel laws of forty states' 0 5 is not to be viewed without criticism. Many
of these states had considered the problem posed by section 315 and
come to reasonable solutions.'0 6 It was ill-considered to curtly reject
these answers.
The Court's opinion is unclear in yet another respect. If federal
procedural law supplants state law, to what extent does federal sub-
stantive law now govern libel actions against the utterer - the candi-
date himself? While there is no reason to suppose that the state sub-
stantive law has been supplanted as well, it may be argued that the
federal interest so manifest in the WDAY situation mandates uni-
100. An "assumption of risk" argument might not carry weight here. But the
effect of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) is not yet known;
it could lend considerable credence to the idea that a public figure, as well as a public
official, is fair game. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
101. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), aff'd, 274 F.2d 705
(6th Cir. 1960).
102. See, e.g., Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied. 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
103. See notes 19 to 25 supra and accompanying text.
104. See Letter to William P. Webb, cited by the FCC in 24 P & F RADIo RZ.
1901, 1921-22 (1962) but otherwise unreported. The case there is not on all fours
with the posed issue, but seems to say that a licensee must censor any script where
only supporters of the candidate appear.
105. For a graphic illustration of how these laws differed, see Note, Censorship
of Defamation in Political Broadcasts: The Port Huron Doctrine, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rrv.
127 n.54 (1959).
106. Most states have enacted "reasonable care" statutes and/or doctrines. Such
statutes, for example, relieved the broadcaster from liability for broadcasting defama-
tory speeches if he used reasonable care in screening the speech, or if he cut it off
as soon as a reasonable man might have thought the speech libelous. This would seem
to be more rational than either the complete immunity doctrine or the strict lia-
bility theory.
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formity in deciding which statements will be considered libelous. That
is to say, since WDAY viewed the federal interest in free and open
political statements as more important than the state interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from publication of the libel, why should the action
against the utterer not be governed by substantive federal laws as
well ?107
E. Is THERE REALLY "No OBLIGATION" TO
CARRY POLITICAL BROADCASTS?
Section 315 states that "No obligation is hereby imposed upon
any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate."
On its face, this language would seem to have the effect of banning
program content review by the FCC, since there would be no duty to
carry political broadcasts. This, however, has not been the case. Despite
the pellucid language of the statute, the Commision has informed
Congress'"8 that it has the power as well as the duty to review the
licensee's overall programming in renewal hearings and that political
broadcasts, including section 315 speeches, will be considered:109
[Section 315] does not provide that the licensee can ignore the
public interest and arbitrarily refuse to serve the needs of his
area as to political broadcasts. Rather, it seems to be directed to
making clear that while a licensee has an obligation to other legally
qualified candidates for office if he presents one candidate for that
office, he has no such obligation with respect to that first candidate;
on the contrary he can use his judgment as to whether there is
an interest in affording time to the particular campaign as against
other political contests, and as to any other programming con-
siderations that may be pertinent.
The Commission thus reaffirmed a position stated in the dicta of
several decisions," 0 notwithstanding the fact that Congress has specifi-
cally rejected the idea that a station should be a common carrier under
section 315 in order to afford the station an opportunity to refuse to
107. To the extent that the law of libel is changed by the doctrine of the New
York Times v. Sullivan case, these statutes would be outmoded; but WDA Y appar-
ently eliminated even malicious publication as a grounds for action against the broad-
caster, a step which the Court refused to take in New York Times v. Sullivan.
See Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by Political
Candidates, 39 VA. L. Rsv. 303 (1953).
108. Obligation of Licensee to Carry Political Broadcasts, 25 P & F RADIO RzG.
1731 (1963).
109. Id. at 1733. But see John B. Commelin, 19 P & F RADIO RwG. 1392 (1960),
where a broadcaster's refusal to sell any time to any candidate during a United StatesSenate primary race was upheld. On the other hand, Newton Minow, former chair-
man of the FCC, has said, "I still think a broadcaster is obliged to carry politicaldiscussion on the air if he is to serve the public interest." N. MINOW, EQUAL TIMs
28 (1964).
110. See Loyola University, 12 P & F RADIO Ria. 1017 (1957) ; City of Jackson-
ville, 12 P & F RADIO Rrc. 113 (1957); KWFT, Inc., 4 P & F RADIO REG. 885(1948); Homer P. Rainey, 3 P & F RADIO RiG. 737 (1947); E. A. Stephens Broad-
casting Co., 3 P & F RADIO Rra. 1 (1945). See also Albuquerque Broadcasting Co.,
3 P & F RADIO leG. 1820 (1946).
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carry any political broadcasting at all." 1 On the other hand, the Com-
mission has never failed to renew a license where the only ground for
complaint was noncompliance with section 315.1 -
II. WHITHER EQUALITY?
It seems abundantly clear that section 315 does not fully serve the
purposes it was designed to serve. The amendments have only intensi-
fied what was already an unclear situation. The pertinent question
thus becomes - what can be done? Four possibilities are usually sug-
gested, and they reach from one extreme of the spectrum to the other:(a) complete repeal with no further statutory regulation; (b) repeal
and replacement of section 315 with application of the "fairness doc-
trine" to all questions; (c) limitation of section 315 to "significant"
parties as determined by past performance; (d) mandatory free time
to all parties.
A. THE CASE FOR REPEAL OR REPLACEMENT
The case for complete repeal or modification of section 315 nor-
mally centers on several arguments: (1) inordinate cost to the broad-
caster of giving free time to all candidates; (2) lack of necessity for
strict rules in an industry which now recognizes its responsibilities;
(3) detriment to the minor parties intended to be protected by the
provision; and (4) the philosophical indefensibility of regulation of
broadcasting, when other monopolies are not regulated.
None of these factors can be dismissed summarily. Undoubtedly
it is costly to grant sustaining ("free") time." 3 Testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Communications indicates that during the
1960 Presidential campaign networks alone "lost" well over $4,000,000
in sustaining time.114 However, the performance of a public duty
111. 67 CoNG. REc. 12502-12505 (1926). See also Friedenthal and Medalie, TheImpact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Com-
munications Act, 72 HARV. L. REv. 445, 476-78 (1959).
112. Controversial Issue Programming - Fairness Doctrine, Letter to Hon.Oren Harris, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, UnitedStates House of Representatives, 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 163 (1963). See alsoMcBride Industries, Inc., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 169 (1963) ; Andrew B. Letson,3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 173 (1962). Five per cent of all broadcasters failed to carry
any political broadcasts during 1962. See Equal Time Hearings, supra note 14, at 1.113. The equal opportunities language of § 315 does not, of course, require alicensee to give free equal time to a candidate whose opponent has paid for his. Thus,if A appears on a purchased time slot, the licensee does not have to grant B free
time equal to A's; the only requirement is that he offer B the same amount of time
at the same rate of compensation. Many of the more difficult cases, however, haveinvolved gratuitous appearances (witness the Lar Daly case itself), and thus have led
to some confusion.
114. Although there appear to be no direct figures available, comparison of the
tables in the FCC Report to the Congress, reprinted on pages 12-31 of the Equal TimeHearings, supra note 14, seems to indicate that, during 1962, television stationsthroughout the country, in all elections, gave some 800 hours of free time to candi-dates, worth approximately $500,000; AM stations offered over 2600 hours of sus-taining time, worth approximately $240,000; and FM stations lost approximately$1500 in revenue through affording some 500 hours of free time. These figures, of
course, are approximate and cannot take into account various factors which might
raise or lower drastically the costs here mentioned.
The figures for the networks may be derived from estimates that coverage of
the "Great Debates" cost each network roughly $600,000 of television time. NBC
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voluntarily accepted at the time of the granting of the license cannot
be foregone because of cost. Moreover, the financial loss, taken in
perspective, is not that great; the requirement operates, in practice, for
only two to three months in every two year period. Surely this is not
an overwhelming burden.
While it cannot be doubted that broadcasting is a far more mature
industry than it was in 1927 when the provision was first enacted, it
may be doubted whether outright repeal is warranted. Complaints
still are lodged; decisions are still necessary. This fact alone bespeaks
the need for some legislative overview.
The third argument is much more potent and has been succinctly
stated as follows :115
[T]he position of the spokesmen for the minor parties and candi-
dates is less well founded. It could well be argued that they suffer
more than anyone else from the operation of 315 as presently
worded and interpreted. Both major parties can have access by
right of demonstrated political importance and depth of purse.
But minor parties have comparatively little chance, and a standard
of equality that encompasses all of them is sure to hurt the more
important and newsworthy among them. . . . [T]he better ones
have less opportunity to get free time than they would if 315 were
repealed or modified.
Equal time is sometimes attacked at its very roots. Thus, Richard
Salant has written that "No new-born idea has a right to public ac-
ceptance or to equal public attention and press exposure. But each
does have a right to try to gain that attention and exposure without
legislative obstacles to growth."" 6
Mr. Salant further believes that regulation of political broadcasting
is discriminatory. We do not require railroads, which are regulated
as common carriers in the public interest, he says, to give free passage
to candidates, nor do we demand that other industries controlled by
government similarly acquiesce in lower rates or free service. How-
lost an additional $1.1 million. If this is any indication of the cost to the other net-
works, the figures supplied are eminently conservative. See Equal Time Hearings 241.
See also Hearings Before the Communications Subcomm. of the Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 68 (Senate 1961).
115. Thomson, Television, Politics and Public Policy, 8 PUBLIC POLICY 368, 390,
403 (1958). However, FCC Chairman E. William Henry, testifying before the
Senate Subcommittee on Communications in 1963, testified that "the fact that there
were three or more candidates, and 315 was in effect, did not seem, at least statistically,
to prevent the broadcasters from giving at least as much time as they did where
there were only two candidates and they could have given all they wanted theo-
retically." Equal Time Hearings, supra note 14, at 71. In fact, the chairman testified,
the figures showed that "there was a slightly greater percentage of stations giving
free time in the multicandidate states." Id. at 79. Minor parties seem to have been
the victims when Congress suspended § 315 in 1960. Lawrence Speiser, testifying at
the same hearings, averred that the "free time they [the networks] gave in 1960 ...
was just about the same as the amount they gave in 1956 [when § 315 was in force].
But the time they gave to all of the minority parties on radio was one-fourteenth as
much [as in 1956] and as for television it was one-eighth as much." Id. at 138. These
figures were disputed by Frank Stanton, CBS president. Id. at 220-42.




ever, surely one may easily distinguish between the two types of
activities simply on the basis of their respective effects on the cam-
paign. Salant's argument, of course, is basically an equal protection
argument. But, as has been stated so many times that authority need
not be cited, Congress need not regulate all evil-doers to assure that
its laws are declared nondiscriminatory. The regulation is clearly
reasonable, and the class defined truly separable. In short, a reasonable
basis for the difference in treatment exists, and therefore no "invidious
discrimination" is present, and the equal protection argument must fail.
Another aspect of the "discriminatory" argument relies on the
analogy to a free press. We need not pause here to rehash the question
of whether the Commission should be merely a "traffic cop of the
ether""17 or whether in fact the newspaper industry is basically different
from that of broadcasting. The remarks of Senator Howell, one of the
key supporters of the 1927 Radio Act, focus on the difficulty quite
readily :118
Are we to consent to the building up of a great publicity
vehicle and allow it to be controlled by a few men and empower
those few men to determine what the public shall hear?
It may be argued that we do that with newspapers. Yes, that
is true; but anyone is at liberty to start a newspaper and reply.
Not so with a broadcasting station.
The contention is often made that section 315 should be replaced
by wholesale application of the "fairness doctrine." This argument
ignores the difficulties inherent in the amorphous nature of the latter
concept. As the next section indicates, 9 section 315 problems arise
in contexts which demand quick, almost formula answers; areas where
the "fairness doctrine" is applied currently normally do not call for
such prompt response. "Equal time" affords such a formula; the
concept of "fair" time, undefined and undefinable except on a case-by-
case after the fact basis, does not. The converse is likewise true. If
the "fair" time concept is difficult to apply in definite factual settings,
it is especially difficult to predict the results, in terms of the amount
of time which the Commission would require, prior to the case itself
and its resolution. Thus, the "fairness doctrine" lacks the second
attribute of the "equal time" concept: predictability. 20
B. THE CASE FOR LIMITATION - "PERCENTAGE PARTIES"
Still others have proposed that section 315 should be limited in
some way by the percentage of the vote received in previous elections. 1 '
117. This question was put to rest, legally at least, in National Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
118. 67 CONG. Rgec. 12503 (1926) (Remarks of Senator Howell).
119. See notes 140 to 142 infra and accompanying text.
120. It may be that the Commission is no longer predictable, but that fault is not
inherent in § 315.
121. For a discussion of this suggestion as well as others, see Friedenthal and
Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315
of the Communications Act, 72 HARV. L. Rev. 445 (1959). At least one writer has
suggested such a percentage plan. See Derby, Section 315: Analysis and Proposal,
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This, it may be noted, is the system used by the BBC. The proposal,
however, ignores the point that most of the fringe party candidates
who have had Presidential campaigns of any size, Theodore Roosevelt,
Robert LaFollette, and Strom Thurmond, for example, 1 22 would have
been excluded by such a requirement, since these parties arose from
sudden splits within the major parties rather than from prolonged
existence. The case against such a plan, operating in vacuo and with-
out a minimum guide, has been well put by Richard Salant :123
It is doubtful that the difficulties can yield to satisfactory solution
for they seem to be inherent in any attempt to define in advance
who is a major candidate and what is a major party. American
politics is, and should be, too volatile and dynamic to permit these
attempts to succeed.
C. THE CASE FOR MANDATED FREE TIME
As we have previously noted, section 315 does not require a
licensee to give free sustaining time to an opponent of a candidate who
has appeared in a purchased time slot; it requires only that the licensee
offer the opponent the same amount of time for the same rate. The
rising costs of political broadcasting in political campaigns 2 4 have led
many to question the feasibility of this plan. Senator Clark has
recently proposed an amendment to section 315 which would require
that the holder of a license "make available to candidates for Federal,
State, and (to the extent feasible) local public office free broadcast time
on a fair and equitable basis."' 25 Others have reached the same result
on a philosophical level: "It is the duty of the state to foster minority
views in the face of both majority apathy and hostility."'2 6 The pro-
posal has been attacked as a "discriminatory tax"' 27 which would con-
fiscate "manpower, equipment and investments of millions of dollars."' 28
The FCC has, indirectly, recognized the desirability of mandated
free time in other areas. Thus, such free time is now required by
Commission regulation under the "individual attack doctrine" of the
"fairness doctrine." Under that rule, a licensee must give equal time
(or fair time) to a person who is individually attacked on any program
3 HARV. J. LgGiS. 257 (1966). In fact, Senate Bill 3171, introduced in 1960, would
have required equal opportunities for only those candidates whose parties received 4%
or more of the popular vote in the previous election. The bill died quickly.
122. Or Governor Wallace?
123. Salant, supra note 116, at 362.
124. Senator Clark has stated that total costs for political broadcasting in a non-
presidential year rose from $20 million in 1962 to $32 million in 1966. 1967 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 188-89.
125. S. 1548, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962). The specifics of the system would be
left to the FCC.
126. Blaine, Equality, Fairness and § 315: The Frustration of Democratic Politics,
24 MD. L. Rtv. 166, 178 (1964).
127. Testimony of Bruce Dennis, President of Radio-TV News Directors Associa-
tion, 1967 Hearings, supra note 7, at 383-84.




by any speaker, whether that speaker appeared on a sponsored program
or on sustaining time. 12 9 Moreover, while the vitality and effect of
the Commission's new rulings under the fairness doctrine on cigarette
commercials is not yet clear, these rules would also seem to have the
effect of requiring free time to respond, even to sponsored program-
ming, if necessary.'
If free time may be commanded for personal attacks, or to protect
the listener's lungs, it should be well within the power of the Com-
mission, and certainly of Congress, to require such a concession in the
case of political broadcasting. It is true, of course, that the legislative
history will not support the proposal for free time.' 31 Mass communi-
cation is no longer a luxury of politics; it is often the very essence.
Radio and television appear to command more attention than the other
forms of news information combined. Assuming that the FCC should
to some extent control programming and that the government should
to some degree be interested in the quality of matter that is dissemi-
nated by its licensees, why is it not possible, in fact plausible, to argue
that section 315 should be used to increase political awareness of all
parties? It is conceded that the first amendment prohibits control of
the press, but have we not already discarded the notion that radio and
television are completely protected by this amendment? And if this is
true, why should it not be the duty of the government to guarantee the
right of free access to all parties?
As an ideal, mandated, or even subsidized, free time might be
the ultimate solution. For the present, however, this ideal is incapable
of being realized. Moreover, some limit would clearly have to be drawn
on the amount of time thus set aside; no such limit has yet been
suggested.' 31
III. THE REGULATORY BACKDROP
Regardless of which of these alternatives, if any, is ultimately
selected to solve the dilemma, one thing is clear - enforcement of that
standard will be the job of the FCC. Yet, as this article has attempted
to illustrate, the Commission has often failed to enforce the present
standards in any meaningful way. New methods - and new sanctions
- are called for.
A. NEW METHODS
The primary method presently used for interpretation and enforce-
ment by the FCC is the issuance of advisory opinions. While the
Commission officially states that it "limits its interpretative rulings or
129. It would not necessarily oppose such a view, however. See discussion note 4
supra and accompanying text.
130. 36 U.S.L.W. 2047 (1967).
131. FCC Document 67-641, June 2, 1967, reported at 35 U.S.L.W. 2731 (1967).
132. Senator Clark's bill is openended, leaving this task to the Commission with
no guidelines whatever. This is a glaring weakness of the bill.
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advisory opinions to situations where the critical facts are explicitly
stated without the possibility that subsequent events will alter them,"' 3 8
the policy is not uniformly followed.
This apparent over-reliance on advisory opinions need not be. The
Commission clearly has rule-making power in connection with the equal
time provision. It is explicitly granted such power in the section itself. 34
Moreover, it is clearly the intent of Congress that the Commission
utilize this power :115
The Committee wants to make it clear that it agrees with the
statement contained in Commissioner Fred Ford's letter to Senator
John 0. Pastore dated June 24, 1959, that the committee fully
intends for the Commission to exercise the rule making authority
in section 315(c) on questions arising under the provisions of
this bill and relating to the details concerning programs exempt
from the operation of section 315(a).
To the extent that the natural increase in the FCC's workload
at election times tends to hinder FCC efforts to adjudicate complaints
before election day has passed, the exercise of its rule-making power
would ease this burden, since this power can be exercised during the
time between elections, while adjudications arise only during election
periods. Moreover, rule-making as a method of achieving a regulatory
system is preferable to ad hoc adjudication, since legislative rules are
arguably promulgated with a more acute understanding of the prob-
lems and ramifications involved. Furthermore, under the FCC type
of statute, such rules have the force of law. 3  The scope of judicial
review would therefore be narrowed, but the uncertainty now inherent
in the regulatory scheme would be mitigated.'3 7 No system, however,
133. Pierson, Ball and Dowd, 24 P & F RADIO REG. 1901, 1925 (1958). Although
the Commission is reluctant to advise a station whether the proposed appearance of
a candidate will create an equal time obligation (See, e.g., Fisher, Wayland, Duvall
and Southmayd, 1960, reported in the Final Report on Freedom of Communications
of the Subcomnm. on Communications of the Senate Commerce Comm., Part V, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1962)), after a candidate has appeared, the Commission has
shown no hesitancy in informing the broadcaster at that time whether he should give
equal time to other candidates.
134. 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1964).
135. S. Rip. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959). The Commission hasjust recently used its rule-making power to "codify" its "personal attack" doctrine
of the "fairness doctrine," which specifies that if a licensee allows a speaker to directly
impugn the personal integrity of another individual, the attacked person may demand
free time to respond. 36 U.S.L.W. 2047 (1967).
136. Rules promulgated under specific power granted expressly in enabling legisla-
tion have been dubbed "legislative rules" by Professor Davis. 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINIS-
"rRATivn LAw TREATISX § 5.03 (1958). These rules have the force and effect of
legislation and may not be overturned, as may interpretative rules, unless they arc
violative of constitutional doctrines.
137. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 35 U.S.L.W. 2287 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
the D.C. Circuit recently held that advisory letters are not "final orders" and hence
not reviewable. Judge Fahy, dissenting, argued that the letter "placed Red Lion
under obligation to comply as directed by the Commission .... " Id. at 2287. The
dissent's position is clearly correct, especially in view of Frozen Food Express v.
United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956) (which held that an ICC "order" is reviewable).
The Supreme Court itself has denied certiorari in one case involving such letters,
Goldwater v. FCC, 379 U.S. 893 (1964), but the two dissenting judges did not indi-
cate that lack of jurisdiction was the reason for denial. Moreover, both the Fifth
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can safely predict the various hybrids which may arise. When situa-
tions arise not covered by existing rules, advisory opinions could
be issued.
Any regulatory system must have as its objectives at least two
goals: (1) predictability, and (2) effective and immediate enforce-
ability. The latter is especially important in this area because of the
glaring inadequacy of post-election relief. There is no remedy in law
or equity, aside from the radical one of upsetting the election, which
will fully compensate the defeated candidate. 3 ' Resort to rule-mak-
ing, in addition to increasing the predictability of Commission action,
would aid in assuring immediacy of enforceability. This is not to
suggest that the Commission has been slow to act on most equal
time complaints. To the contrary, the record demonstrates a growing
capacity for quick action.139 However, improvement is possible and
more frequent rule-making by the Commission will undoubtedly ex-
pedite the achievement of the stated objectives.
B. NEW SANCTIONS
Notwithstanding the Commission's strong words on the responsi-
bilities of the broadcaster, 40 no licensee has ever been disciplined for
failure to comply with section 315. In fact, despite the existence of
the "fairness doctrine" for over fifteen years, the Commission took
steps only recently to enforce the dictates of that doctrine.' The record
is hardly one which would breed respect for the statements of the
Commission.
In the past, lack of enforcement may have been caused, or at least
excused, by an inability of the Commission to impose fitting sanctions.
The Commission has long had the power to deny license renewals and
to revoke licenses.' 4 2 But these powers have not been invoked for
violations of section 315, and probably rightly so, since they are much
too harsh for the offense. They would result in the public's being denied
a useful service for one violation; the punishment would clearly be
disproportionate to the crime.
Recently, the Commission has been equipped with more appro-
priate enforcement powers. A Complaint and Compliance Division
has been added which measures a licensee's performance against his
promises. In 1960, the Commission was given authority to levy fines
for failure to observe a Commission cease-and-desist order. 4 ' And
and Seventh Circuits have held such a letter reviewable. Fadell v. FCC, 25 P & F
RADIO R.c. 288 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Brigham v. FFC, 276 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1960). See
also 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRArIvE LAW TR8ATISP § 4.10 (1958).
138. Private law usually aims at the compensatory; the punitive, however, can at
times be just as potent in effectuating social policy.
139. N. MINow, EQUAL TIMe 31 (1964): ". . . the speed with which the FCC
today processes political complaints is jet-propelled when compared to the red-taped
procedures that frustrated broadcasters and politicians in 1952 and 1956."
140. See Obligation of Licensees to Carry Political Broadcasting, 25 P & F RADIO
RwG. 1731 (1963).
141. See United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
142. See 44 Stat. 1088 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 312(a) (1964).
143. 44 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 74 Stat. 894 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)
(1964). Currently, this sanction may not be exercised until after a "hearing," which
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the superficially low statutory maximum of $1000 on any fine serves
to be no bar to the effectiveness of the sanction, since every day that
the violation continues constitutes a separate offense.
While these remedies may be helpful, they are not sufficient. As
the law now stands, an individual action for damages against a station
for violation of section 315 will not lie.' 44 If an action for damages
were allowed, probabilities of greater compliance with the section's
commands would be increased. It is submitted that such a change
should be forthcoming.
IV. SECTION 315: A SUGGESTION
None of the proposals outlined in section II, or the reasons which
prompted them, are to be dismissed lightly. Yet each is stated by its
proponents as the "only" answer to what is clearly a highly complex
and controversial issue. In the hope of not appearing too naive, the
author would suggest that several of these alternatives might be com-
bined to produce a reasonable result. It is possible that this suggested
answer combines only the worst elements of each proposal; on the other
hand, it may appear to solve the dilemmas posed by the extreme views,
while not sacrificing, in principle, the values they cherish. With this
apology, let us state the proposal.
It seems clear that, at the present time, there are two major parties
in the United States. It is submitted that this fact should be recognized
as a fact and that, as between these two parties, the strict requirements
of equal time should be maintained; in addition, the amendments of
1959, save for the one exempting newscasts, should be repealed. Thus,
absolute equality for all candidates of these parties would be required,
whether they appeared on debates, panel shows, variety shows, news
interviews, or whatever.
As to candidates of other parties, the following proposal is made:
that no candidate, whatever his party, whatever his past record, be
denied the right to an amount of time equal to a specific fixed per-
centage (perhaps 50%) of that enjoyed by the major parties on all
non-exempt shows.' 45 Thus, if President Johnson appears for a half
cannot be held less than thirty days after notice. 48 Stat. 1086 (1936), as amended,
66 Stat. 716 (1952), 74 Stat. 893 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1964). This notice
requirement would, of course, impair the efficacy of such a procedure. But it could
be applied to complaints early in the campaign, since the "hearing" language need not
be interpreted to be an "evidentiary" hearing. Moreover, an amendment to the pro-
vision might well be in order.
144. Daly v. West Central Broadcasting Co., 201 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. Ill.),
aff'd, 309 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1962). Although the West Central decision clearly stated
that there was no right to bring a private action under § 315, there is interesting
language in the lower court's opinion, not commented upon by the court of appeals,
which might provide a springboard. The district court stated: "no provision of the
Act creates, either by expression or necessary implication, any private right of action
which is cognizable, in the first instance, by the district court." Id. at 241 (emphasis
added). Combined with the principle that there must be exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the court's statement might be construed as indicating a "primary, but not
exclusive" jurisdictional holding. And perhaps it would be wise to allow a private
action under § 315, for a vindication of the public's rights as well as of those of the
candidate himself. Cf. Singer, Church of Christ: Standing and the Evidentiary
Hearings, 55 GEo. L.J. 264 (1966).
145. The figure, of course, is not static; it is merely a suggestion for a base line.
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hour on "Meet the Press," the Vegetarian candidate14 should be
allowed to express his views, on the same show, for a total of at least
fifteen minutes. Thus far, at least, the desirable aspects of an objectively
ascertainable standard would be maintained. Also maintained would
be an assurance, for every candidate of any party, of some time in
which to expound his views. While complete equality would not reign,
substantial equality would be assured.
These are minimum standards. It is also suggested that an ob-
jectively definable scale be enacted which would increase the amount
of time to which a candidate would be entitled based on the showing
of his party in the last race of the same nature. For example, the figure
of 10% of the amount of time could vary with a fixed percentage,
say 4%, of the past vote.' 47 Thus, the following scale would prevail:
Percentage of Total Percentage of Time Used By
Vote Received in Major Parties to Which
Last Election Minor Party Entitled
0% 50%
1 - 3.99% 60%
4 - 7.99% 70%
8 - 11.99% 80%
12 - 15.99% 90%
over 16% 100%
The proposed scheme would have many advantages. It would pro-
vide objective standards for immediate enforceability and would recog-
nize the right of minority candidates to the opportunty for exposition
of their ideas, while at the same time tempering this right with the
recognition of the costs to broadcasters of making this time available.
It would further provide for a "proportionate" equality based on past
performance, thereby differentiating to some extent the "legitimate"
146. This assumes that no federal standard for candidacy is enacted. See notes 12
to 14 supra and accompanying text. As noted there, many of the problems the broad-
caster faces can be attributed not to the FCC, but to the inaction of legislatures, state
and federal, in defining who is a candidate. It is with these bodies, not the Com-
mission, that many of the complaints should be lodged.
147. A scheme much like the present one was suggested in Derby, supra note 67,
and adopted in rough form in S. 2090, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by
Senator Scott on July 12, 1967). But in both cases, the minimum level, 1/30 in Derby,5% in the Scott proposal, seems much too low. If one accepts the normal 30-minute
news interview program as a base figure (assuming the repeal of the exemptions),
Senator Scott would allow the minor candidate 90 seconds; Mr. Derby would be even
more pernurious, granting only one minute - no more - to expound views on all
the various social and economic questions confronting the nation. Mr. Derby suggests
that ability to muster more than a given per cent of voters on a petition should also
be considered; this is not reflected in Senator Scott's bill. While the suggestion is
reasonable, it seems to be the result of an attempt to mitigate the harshness of the
low minimum percentage figures in Mr. Derby's proposal; therefore, if the 50%
minimum figures here suggested be accepted, petition power should become virtually
irrelevant. Neither proposal indicates whether broadcasters could, with immunity,
provide more than the stipulated amount. It is submitted that this freedom should
be expressly provided.
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third parties from the "crackpots," and would permit the former more
opportunity to grow in accord with their popular acceptance. 4 "
There are faults, of course. The proposed plan would, to some
extent, penalize the newly sprung minority party which may in fact be
a genuine contender, or at least a potential spoiler. But here, it should
be noted, the proposal deals only in minimal figures; if the broadcaster,
exercising his honest news judgment, wishes to give more than the
minimum, he is free to do so without incurring liability to other parties.
While the plan provides an objective standard, it is also open to
criticism on the ground that it accords the broadcaster too much
freedom in the exercise of his subjective judgment. But this is at least
bounded by some guidelines, and, in fact, broadcasting has come of
age to warrant such discretion. At the very least, it is hoped that the
proposal will stimulate some re-thinking on the part of those who have
already refused, time and time again, to budge from positions long
deemed unrealistic.
148. It might be possible to define a "major party" as one which obtains a minimum
fixed percentage of the vote in three successive elections. This would allow "minor
parties" to attain legally equal status with the current "major parties."
